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Summary 
The thesis you are about to read concerns the expression “court or tribunal 
of a Member State” contained within Article 234 of the Treaty. While the 
Article is silent as to what is to define such a body, the European Court of 
Justice has ruled that it is for the Court to rule upon which bodies constitute 
a court or tribunal for the purposes of making a preliminary ruling reference. 
Hence, the Court has, since the early days of the Community, established 
and refined certain criteria it can take into account when making such a 
judgement. As in all aspects of law, the ECJ’s jurisprudence on the matter is 
not without its fair share of controversy. There are many, and I am one of 
them, that have accused the Court of being lax regarding a strict 
interpretation of the criteria it some decades ago held so dear. Moreover, the 
Court’s liberal attitude comes to blaring light in the Opinion of Advocate 
General Jacobs in Case C-53/03 Syfait, in which he opted to allow a 
reference from a national competition authority with certain judicial 
characteristics. While an Opinion of an Advocate General is not binding 
upon the ECJ, the potential implications of Syfait, following a positive 
ruling by the Court, are important to consider.     
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Article 234 of the Treaty (formerly Article 177 EEC)1 provides for the 
preliminary ruling procedure and has been of paramount importance to the 
development of Community law. Namely, it is through the system of 
preliminary rulings that the Court has developed various groundbreaking 
concepts, two such being the direct effect and supremacy of EC law2. 
Moreover, the provision is an indirect way of testing the validity of 
Community action and has been a valuable mechanism through which 
national courts and the ECJ have engaged in a legal discourse on the 
appropriate reach of Community law. There would have been few, at the 
inception of Treaty, that could have fathomed the importance of the Article, 
yet it is very much the “icing on the cake” of the Court’s jurisdiction3. It 
reads as follows: 
 
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: 
 
(a) the interpretation of the Treaty; 
 
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community and of the 
ECB;  
 
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council, where 
those statutes so provide. 
 
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court 
or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to 
give judgement, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. 
 
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member 
State, against whose decision there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or 
tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice.  
 
Despite its relative straightforwardness, it is essential to observe that Article 
234 is framed in terms of a “court or tribunal of a Member State”, that may 
or shall make a reference. The provision is, however, silent in providing an 
exact definition of what is to define such a body. In a lesser world, we could 
be aimlessly pondering the following question: to which courts or tribunals 
does Article 234 of the Treaty apply? Luckily, this is not the case, since the 
                                                 
1 In order to avoid confusion, all material in the remainder of this thesis using the former 
numbering Article 177 is replaced with the current numbering Article 234. 
2 The ECJ first articulated its doctrine of direct effect in 1963 in what is probably the most 
famous of all its ruling, namely Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie 
Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, [1963] 
ECR 1. The supremacy of Community law was ruled upon in Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v. 
ENEL, [1964] ECR 585. 
3 Craig, Paul, and De Búrca, Gráinne, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 3rd edition, 
2003, pp. 432, 433. 
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European Court of Justice has made it clear that it is for Court to decide 
whether a body is a court or tribunal under Article 234 and that the 
categorization of that body under national law is not conclusive. Based upon 
their vested powers, a helping hand is there for the taking in the roughly 
four decades of jurisprudence tackling this matter. To this regard, the ECJ 
has developed, in an array of judgements, various factors it can take into 
account when determining if an entity is an actual court or tribunal. More 
specifically, these criteria include: whether law establishes the body, 
whether it is permanent, whether it applies rules of law, whether its final 
decision is judicial in nature whether it is independent, whether its 
procedure is inter partes, and whether its jurisdiction is compulsory 4
1.2 Purpose 
With the above in mind, the objective of this thesis is to relay how the 
European Court of Justice has defined “court or tribunal of a Member State” 
contained within Article 234 of the Treaty.  
1.3 Method, material, and delimitations  
In order to accomplish the above task, I will make use of a traditional legal 
method. I further assume that the reader has prior knowledge of Community 
law. Court rulings and the Opinions of various Advocate Generals, defining 
a court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 234, make up the bulk of the 
material used. The remaining material comes from Community legislation, 
relevant legal doctrine, correspondence via email with varying national 
competition authorities, and the World Wide Web. 
 
While this paper deals with Article 234 of the Treaty, I will for the most part 
limit myself to defining what constitutes a court or tribunal within its 
meaning; consequently, other aspects of the Article fall outside the scope of 
the thesis. Furthermore, while this paper touches briefly upon Regulation 
1/20035, I will only provide the precise amount of information relevant to 
assessing the possible implications of allowing certain national competition 
authorities the right to make use of Article 234. Hence, a detailed analysis of 
the Regulation will not be relayed here, yet can be readily attained in the 
vast sea of literature on the topic. Lastly, Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty 
and their application, while important to have in mind when reading Chapter 
5 of the thesis, will not be expanded upon in any greater detail. 
                                                 
4 Ibid., p. 436. 
5 Council Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down 
in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, [2003] OJ L1/1. 
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1.4 Disposition 
Chapter 2 contains the leading jurisprudence concerning the criteria the 
Court of Justice can take into account when defining a court or tribunal 
allowed to make a preliminary ruling reference. These rulings are divided, 
more or less, into subsections on a criterion-by-criterion basis. I conclude 
the chapter with a recent Court ruling that takes into full account the roughly 
four decades of jurisprudence, making it easier to see the Court’s current 
position on the matter. 
 
Chapter 3 relays the concern of Advocate General Colomer towards what he 
sees as a far too liberal approach taken by the Court of Justice in its case-
law. His proposal for a more straightforward definition as to what should 
constitute a court or tribunal under Article 234 is also provided for. 
 
Chapter 4 begins with a section that examines AG Jacob’s arguments for 
allowing the Greek Competition Commission the right to refer questions to 
the Court in Case C-53/03 Syfait6. Immediately following that section, I will 
attempt to analyze the correctness of his reasoning from a jurisprudential 
point of view, where relevant aiming criticism at his arguments. I conclude 
the chapter with a section that shortly summarizes the most important 
changes brought on by way of Regulation 1/2003, follows the positive and 
negative implications of allowing an NCA to refer questions, and ends with 
whether the Swedish, Finnish, and Danish national competition authorities 
could theoretically also seek the ECJ’s guidance.  
 
Chapter 5, though short and sweet, makes way for my concluding remarks. 
 
In conclusion, it is my sincere wish that my readers finds this thesis 
informative, furthering their understanding on this aspect of Community 
law. That being said, without delay, let us begin! 
   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-53/03 Synetairismos Farmakopoion 
Aitolias & Akarnanias (Syfait) and Others v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE, awaiting the 
judgement of the Court, currently available on www.curia.eu.int. 
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2 Defining the criteria: the 
case-law of the Court 
This section aims to look at the jurisprudence of the Court establishing, 
defining, and refining the criteria they can take into account when 
determining whether a national body constitutes a court or tribunal within 
the meaning of Article 234 of the Treaty. 
2.1 Establishing the criteria 
In the beginning days of the Community, the Court lacked clear factors it 
could take into consideration if it were to rule whether a Member State 
entity was a court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 234. More 
specifically, not until 1966 did the Court establish these much-needed 
interpreting tools. 
2.1.1 Vaassen (née Göbbels) 
The question of whether or not an entity constituted a court or tribunal arose 
for the first time in Case 61/65 Vaassen (née Göbbels)7. 
2.1.1.1 Background and admissibility 
The case concerned Mrs. Vaassen, a widow of a Dutch non-manual worker, 
who was entitled in that capacity to a pension paid out of the pension fund 
of the Beambtenfonds voor het Mijnbedrijf (BFM). Mrs. Vaassen came into 
conflict with the management of the BFM and took her case before the 
Scheidsgerecht van het Beambtenfonds voor het Mijnbedrifj (the Arbitration 
Tribunal of the Fund for non-manual workers employed in the mining 
industry, hereinafter “the Arbitration Tribunal”), which had the jurisdiction 
to entertain appeals against the formers decisions. Mrs. Vaassen argued 
before the Arbitration Tribunal that the management of the BFM had 
reached a decision contrary to Community law. In order to resolve the case, 
the Arbitration Tribunal referred to the European Court of Justice a request 
for interpretation.  
 
It did not however do so without examining its own right to submit the case. 
The Arbitration Tribunal maintained that although it could not be 
considered as a court or tribunal under Dutch law, this did not exclude the 
possibility that it should be regarded as a court or tribunal within the 
meaning of Article 234 of the Treaty. To their defence, they added that, 
according to the rules governing the BFM, the Arbitration Tribunal was the 
only body that could give judgments on any disputes that arose and there 
was no appeal against its decisions. Disagreeing with the Arbitration 
                                                 
7 Case 61/65 G. Vaassen (née Göbbels) v. Scheidsgerecht van het Beambtenfonds voor het 
Mijnbedrijf, [1966] ECR 261. 
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Tribunal, the management of the BFM submitted that the former reached 
only non-binding opinions and was therefore not competent to make the 
reference.8
 
The ruling on admissibility was as follows. The Court of Justice found that 
the Arbitration Tribunal was properly constituted under Dutch law and was 
provided for by the rules governing the BFM. Further account was taken to 
the fact that the Minister responsible for the mining industry was to appoint 
the members of the Arbitration Tribunal, he designated its Chairman, and 
laid down its rules of procedure. Moreover, the Arbitration Tribunal was a 
permanent body that settled disputes in general terms under the rules 
governing the BFM and abided by rules of adversary procedure similar to 
those used in ordinary courts of law. Concluding its reasoning, the Court 
articulated that the persons referred to in the rules governing the BFM were 
compulsorily members of the BFM by virtue of a regulation laid down by 
the Council of the Mining Industry, a body established under public law. 
They were to take any disputes between themselves and their insurer to the 
Arbitration Tribunal as the proper judicial body that applied rules of law.9
 
Based on the above, the ECJ found that the Arbitration Tribunal constituted 
a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 234 of the Treaty. 
2.1.1.2 Remarks 
W.L. Haardt, from the University of Leyden, argued in the C.M.L.R 1966-
1967 that the ruling gave no direct answer to the question whether pursuant 
to Article 234 arbitrators may, and sometimes are bound to, request the 
Court of Justice to render a preliminary ruling concerning matters of 
Community law. He maintained that although the Court in the present case 
replied in the affirmative, its ruling was largely determined by the special 
character of the Arbitration Tribunal. Consequently, he warned of drawing 
any general conclusions in respect to ordinary arbitral tribunals.10 An 
analysis of under what conditions an arbitral court or tribunal can qualify as 
a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 234 is examined in a later 
section of this chapter. 
 
What Vaassen (née Göbbels) did determine was that the Court now had five 
criteria it could rely upon when determining if an entity was to be 
considered a court or tribunal, namely: whether law establishes the body, 
whether it is permanent, whether it applies rules of law, whether its 
jurisdiction is compulsory, and whether its procedure is inter partes. It 
should also be noted that, since this judgment, the ECJ has in subsequent 
                                                 
8 Opinion of Advocate General Gand in Case 61/65 Vaassen (née Göbbels), [1966] ECR 
279, p. 280, paras. 3-5. 
9 Note 7 above, p. 272, 273, paras. 2-5 in the section Grounds of Judgement, subsection The 
admissibility of the request for interpretation. 
10 Haardt, W.L., Annotation on Case 61/65 Vaassen (née Göbbels), C.M.L.R. 1966-1967, p. 
441. 
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cases sought to ascertain whether those requirements are met, it has refined 
and perfected them, and even added others.11
2.2 Final decision of a judicial nature 
This section provides for the case-law relating to the final decision of a 
judicial nature criterion, not provided for in Vaassen (née Göbbels) and first 
established some 15 years later. 
2.2.1 Borker 
The factor of whether a final decision is judicial in nature was added in Case 
138/80 Borker12. 
2.2.1.1 Background and admissibility 
By a decision of 27 May 1980, the Conseil de l’Ordre des Avocats á la Cour 
de Paris (Bar Council of the Cour de Paris) submitted a reference at the 
behest of Jules Borker, a member of the Paris Bar who had been refused the 
right to the pursuit of his activities as a lawyer before two German courts.13
 
After a review of the scope of Article 234 of the Treaty, the Court 
concluded that it was apparent that the ECJ can only be requested to give a 
preliminary ruling by a court or tribunal that is called upon to give a 
judgement in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature. 
That was not the position in the case at hand, since the Bar Council of the 
Cour de Paris did not have before it a case that it was under a legal duty to 
try, but rather a request for a declaration relating to a dispute between a 
member of the Paris Bar and the courts or tribunals of another Member 
State. Accordingly, the body had no right to seek a reference before the 
Court.14
2.2.1.2 Related rulings: Razanatsimba, Broekmeulen, 
and Bauer 
The decision of the Court of Justice in Borker demonstrated the correctness 
of a decision reached just three years earlier by the French courts. In Case 
65/77 Razanatsimba15, the Cour d’Appel of Douai shot down the decision 
of the Conseil de l’Ordre des Avocats au Barreau de Lille (Bar Council of 
Lille) to refer to the Court two questions concerning the claimed right of a 
third-country national to be admitted at the Lille Bar. The Cour d’ Appel of 
Douai articulated that when the Bar Council of Lille gave a ruling on 
admission it was acting in an administrative capacity and not as a court or 
tribunal.16
                                                 
11 Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-17/00 De Coster, [2001] 
ECR I-9447, p. 9452, para. 17. 
12 Case 138/80 Jules Borker, [1980] ECR 1975. 
13 Ibid., p. 1976, paras. 1, 2. 
14 Ibid., p. 1977, paras. 3-5. 
15 Case 65/77 Jean Razanatsimba, [1977] ECR 2229. 
16 Ibid., pp. 2236, 2237, paras. 1-5.   
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In Case 246/80 Broekmeulen17, the ECJ entertained a reference for a 
preliminary ruling from a Dutch body called the Commissie van Beroep 
Huisartsgeneeskunde (Appeals Committee for General Medicine, 
hereinafter “the Appeals Committee”). The Appeals Committee heard 
appeals from a body that was responsible for registering those who wished 
to practice medicine in the Netherlands. Both of the bodies were established 
under the Royal Netherlands Society for the Promotion of Medicine. The 
Society was considered a private association, even though it was indirectly 
recognized in other parts of Dutch law. The Appeals Committee was not a 
court or tribunal under Dutch law, yet followed an adversarial procedure and 
allowed for legal representation. C. Broekmeulen, a Dutch national that was 
qualified for practice in Belgium, sought to establish himself as a doctor in 
the Netherlands, but his application for registration was denied.18   
 
Before ruling on the substantive issues of the case, the Court found that the 
Appeals Committee was a court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 234 
of the Treaty. It articulated the following: 
 
(…) in the absence, in practice, of any right of appeal to the ordinary courts, the Appeals 
Committee, which operates with the consent of the public authorities and with their 
cooperation, and which, after an adversarial procedure, delivers decisions which are 
recognised as final, must, in a matter involving the application of Community law, be 
considered as a court or tribunal of a Member State within the meaning of Article 234 of 
the Treaty.19
 
A final ruling of interest is Case C-166/91 Bauer20. In the case, the ECJ 
accepted a preliminary ruling reference from the Conseil d’Expression 
Française l’Ordre des Architectes (an appellate committee of the Belgian 
Association of Architects). The appellate body was to give judgement upon 
a refusal of a regional council of the Association of Architects to register an 
architect with non-Belgian qualifications. Neither the Advocate General nor 
the ECJ commented on the admissibility of the reference. Most likely, this 
was because the case was seen as an application of the position established 
in Broekmeulen.21
2.2.1.3 Remarks 
Member States often delegate the task of implementing their EC law 
obligations to professional associations. In the field of the free movement of 
professional persons and the freedom to provide services this is especially 
common. So long as there exists sufficient governmental involvement to 
confer the requisite official status upon such bodies, professional appellate 
committees whose decisions are capable affecting the exercise of such rights 
                                                 
17 Case 246/80 C. Broekmeulen v. Huisarts Registratie Commissie, [1981] ECR 2311. 
18 Note 3 above, p. 436. 
19 Note 17 above, p. 2328, para. 18.  
20 Case C-166/91 Gerhard Bauer v. Conseil National de l’Ordre des Architectes, [1992] 
ECR I-2797. 
21 Anderson, David W.K., References to the European Court, 1995, p. 35.  
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may very well be capable of making preliminary references.22 However, as 
seen in Borker and similar rulings, their decisions must be judicial in nature. 
2.2.2 Job Centre 
In the spirit of Borker, Case C-111/94 Job Centre23 also articulated that a 
national court or tribunal’s decision must be judicial in nature. 
2.2.2.1 Background and admissibility 
The case concerned a reference from the Tribunale Civile e Penale di 
Milano (Civil and Criminal District Court of Milano, hereiafter “the District 
Court of Milano”) for a preliminary ruling concerning two questions on the 
interpretation of the Treaty. Those questions were raised in the context of an 
application submitted by representatives of Job Centre Coop. (JCC) to the 
District Court of Milano for confirmation of its memorandum of association, 
in accordance with the Italian Civil Code. JCC was a cooperative that was in 
the course of setting up its business operations. According to its articles of 
association, its activities were to include serving as an intermediary in the 
job placement market. In Italy, however, the employment market was 
subject to a mandatory placement system administered by public 
employment agencies and Italian law prohibited acting as an intermediary 
between supply and demand for paid employment. In response, JCC 
submitted that such a prohibition was contrary to Community law.24
 
The Commission and the Italian government raised objections as to the 
admissibility of the questions referred. In particular, they maintained that 
the questions were raised in the context of non-contentious proceedings 
(“giurisdizione volontaria”) whose purpose was to issue an administrative 
decision, not to settle a dispute after hearing arguments from opposing 
parties.25  
 
The ECJ agreed that an application for confirmation of the articles of 
association of a company was examined in Italy under non-contentious 
proceedings. According to the Italian Civil Code, if after hearing the 
submissions of the public authorities the District Court of Milano found that 
the article of association met the conditions laid down by law, it had to order 
the registration of the company. Only after registration could the company 
acquire legal personality and the right to appeal against any adverse 
decision.26
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Ibid., p. 34. 
23 Case C-111/94 Non-contentious proceedings brought by Job Centre Coop. arl, [1995] 
ECR I-3361. 
24 Ibid., pp. 3384, 3385, paras. 1-5. 
25 Ibid., p. 3385, para. 6. 
26 Ibid., p. 3386, para. 7. 
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Based on the above observations, the Court stated the following:  
 
When, in accordance with the applicable national legislation and under the giurisdizione 
volontaria procedure, the national court rules on an application for confirmation of a 
company’s articles of association with a view to its registration, it is performing a non-
judicial function which, in other Member States, is entrusted to administrative authorities. It 
is exercising administrative authority without being at the same time called upon to settle 
any dispute. Only if the person empowered under national law to apply for such 
confirmation seeks judicial review of a decision rejecting that application, and thus of the 
application for registration, may the court seized be regarded as exercising a judicial 
function, for the purposes of Article 234, in respect of an application for the annulment of a 
measure adversely affecting the petitioner.27
 
Consequently, the European Court of Justice deemed that, in this particular 
situation, the District Court of Milano lacked the ability to seek a 
preliminary ruling. 
2.2.2.2 Related rulings: Salzmann, HSB-Wohnbau, & 
Lutz and Others 
The ruling in Job Centre was confirmed some six years later in Case C-
178/99 Salzmann28. The case concerned a reference for a preliminary ruling 
by the Bezirksgericht Bregenz (District Court of Bregenz, Austria) in the 
course of a claim by Mrs. Salzmann for the registration in the land register 
of a contract of sale of an undeveloped plot of land. According to Austrian 
law, the District Court of Bregenz was competent to register real property 
transactions in the land register.29  
 
The Commission, Spanish Government, and Austrian Government 
maintained that the District Court of Bregenz, when it was acting as the 
tribunal responsible for the land register, was not required to decide 
disputes, but to check that applications for registration of titles to property in 
the land register complied with the conditions laid down by law. Recalling 
Job Centre, they were of the opinion that the District Court of Bregenz, in 
that regard, was performing an activity of an administrative, not judicial, 
nature. The Court agreed and denied the reference for a preliminary ruling.30
 
In Case C-86/2000 HSB-Wohnbau31, the Amtsgericht Heidelberg (Local 
Court of Heidelberg, Germany) referred for a preliminary ruling in the 
context of an application by HSB-Wohnbau GmbH, a company 
incorporated under German law, for entry in the German commercial 
register of the transfer of its registered office to Spain.32  
 
In its order of 10 July 2001, the ECJ determined that it was apparent from 
the order for reference that the Local Court of Heidelberg made a reference 
to the Court in its capacity as an authority responsible for keeping the 
                                                 
27 Ibid., p. 3387, para. 11.  
28 Case C-178/99 Doris Salzmann, [2001] ECR I-4421.  
29 Ibid., pp. 4438, 4440, paras. 1, 2, and 9. 
30 Ibid., pp. 4441-4443, paras. 11-17. 
31 Case C-86/2000 HSB-Wohnbau GmbH, [2001] ECR I-5353. 
32 Ibid., p. 5356, paras. 1, 2. 
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commercial register, there was no dispute pending before the Local Court of 
Heidelberg between HSB-Wohnbau and any defendant, and they were the 
first authority to deal with the application for entry of the company. For 
those reasons, the Local Court of Heidelberg was not performing a judicial 
function and the reference was denied.33  
 
A final case of interest is Case C-182/00 Lutz and Others34. In the case, by 
decision of 9 May 2000, the Landesgericht Wels (Regional Court of Wels, 
Austria), sitting as a commercial court in cases relating to the register of 
companies, referred for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 in the course 
of an application brought before that court by Lutz GmbH and Others. 
Under the Austrian Commercial Code, the statutory representatives of 
capital companies had to submit to the court keeping the register of 
companies in whose district they were established the annual accounts and 
the annual report. Recalling that legal obligation, by decision of 2 
November 1999, the Regional Court of Wels ordered Lutz and Others to 
submit within four weeks the annual accounts and annual report, failing to 
do so resulting in a periodic penalty. In view of the fact that the Supreme 
Court of Austria had consistently ruled that the threat of a periodic penalty 
could not be the subject of an action, Lutz and Others brought an application 
before the Constitutional Court of Austria. Before that court, they sought a 
declaration that the national provisions on disclosure of annual accounts and 
the annual report were contrary to a number of fundamental rights and to 
Community law. Waiting for the ruling of the Constitutional Court, the 
Regional Court of Wels extended the period for submission of the 
accounting documents. By order of 29 November 1999, the Constitutional 
Court dismissed the application lodged by Lutz and Others on the ground 
that a periodic penalty could be suspended until a ruling had been given on 
the legality of the obligation breach of which attracted that penalty. In need 
of clarification, the Regional Court of Wels, in the present action, sought the 
wisdom of the ECJ on the above matters.35
 
After a review of the wording and case law of Article 234 of the Treaty, the 
European Court of Justice found that the Regional Court of Wels, when 
sitting as a commercial court, was not dealing with a dispute, but was 
simply maintaining a register of companies. They were limited to 
establishing whether the statutory requirements as to disclosure had been 
satisfied, and could, if necessary, order production of those accounting 
documents on a pain of a periodic penalty. Moreover, the Court found no 
evidence that there existed any dispute before the Regional Court of Wels 
between Lutz and Others and a potential defendant. Based on the above 
reasoning, the ECJ articulated that the Regional Court of Wels was, in 
performing such an activity, exercising a non-judicial function. The 
reference for a preliminary ruling was thereby inadmissible.36
                                                 
33 Ibid., p. 5360, paras. 14-17. 
34 Case C-182/00 Application brought by Lutz GmbH and Others, [2002] ECR I-547. 
35 Ibid., pp. 562, 563, paras. 8-10.   
36 Ibid., p. 566, paras. 15-17. 
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2.2.2.3 Remarks 
The conclusion drawn from Job Centre, Salzmann, and HSB-Wohnbau was 
that the activities concerned had a non-judicial character, based on the 
following factors: 
 
● The questions arose in proceedings related to the entry of a particular 
legal situation in a register; 
 
● the referring body was the first instance seized of an application for 
registration; 
 
● before proceeding with the entry, the referring entities limited themselves 
to establishing that the application satisfied statutory requirements; 
 
● and, a judicial remedy lay against the decision taken. 
 
While Lutz and Others also established that the Regional Court of Wels 
performed an administrative activity, the case distinguished itself from the 
above three cases, in that they did not have before them an application for 
entry of a particular legal situation in a register. Lutz GmbH and Others 
were already registered as a companies and the Regional Court of Wels, 
sitting as a commercial court, was merely requested to review a previous 
administrative decision on the disclosure of those companies’ accounting 
documents. 
 
What all these cases confirmed is that national courts and tribunals that 
satisfy the institutional requirements but apply the procedure for obtaining a 
preliminary ruling when exercising non-judicial functions are not 
considered courts or tribunals within the meaning of Article 234 of the 
Treaty.37
2.3 Whether the body is independent 
Independence in the decision-making process is the hallmark of any 
civilized legal system. Consequently, this section will look at the ECJ’s 
interpretation of that criterion when deciding whether an entity qualifies to 
make use of the preliminary ruling procedure. 
                                                 
37 Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Case C-182/00 Lutz and Others, [2002] ECR 
I-547, pp. 553-556, paras. 15-27. For further rulings on the judicial nature criterion, see 
Case 318/85 Criminal Proceedings against Regina Greis Unterweger, [1986] ECR 955; 
Joined Cases C-69/96 to 79/96 Maria Antonella Garafalo and Others v. Ministero della 
Sanità and Unità Sanitaria Locale (USL) No. 58 di Palermo, [1997] ECR I-5603; Case C-
134/97 Proceeding for a preliminary decision brought by Victoria Film A/S, [1998] ECR I-
7023; Case C-192/98 Ex post facto review proceedings concerning Azienda Nazionale 
Autonoma delle Strade (ANAS), [1999] ECR I-8583; and Case C-440/98 Ex post facto 
proceedings concerning Radiotelevisione Italiana SpA (RAI), [1999] ECR I-8597.      
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2.3.1 Pretore di Salò 
Rather surprisingly, it also took some 20 years for the European Court to 
demand that a court or tribunal must be independent in order to make a 
preliminary ruling reference. The first authority establishing this factor is 
Case 14/86 Pretore di Salò38. 
 
In the case, by order of 13 January 1986, the Pretore di Salò (Magistrate for 
the District of Salò, Italy, hereinafter “the Magistrate”) referred to the Court 
for a preliminary ruling in the course of criminal proceedings against 
persons unknown that were found to have violated a number of provisions 
relating to the protection of waters. The proceedings were initiated 
following a report submitted by an anglers’ association after the death of 
many fish in the River Chiese, due to the many dams placed in the river for 
hydroelectric and irrigation purposes that were said to cause significant and 
sudden changes in the water level. In the context of the preparatory inquiry 
in the aforementioned criminal proceeding, the Magistrate determined it 
necessary to seek the wisdom of the European Court of Justice.39
 
Arguing against admissibility, the Italian Government articulated that the 
Magistrate had the functions of both a public prosecutor and an examining 
magistrate, since the Magistrate carried out preliminary investigations in his 
capacity as a public prosecutor and, where those disclosed no grounds for 
continuing the proceedings, he made an order accordingly in the place of an 
examining magistrate. That order was not a judicial act because it did not 
acquire the force of res judicata and because no reasons needed to be given 
for it, whereas Italian law imposed a strict obligation to state reasons in the 
case of judicial acts.40
 
The Court, taking into account the above, determined the following: 
 
The Court has jurisdiction to reply to a request for a preliminary ruling if that request 
emanates from a court or tribunal which has acted in the general framework of its task of 
judging, independently and in accordance with the law, cases coming within the jurisdiction 
conferred on it by law, even though certain functions of that court or tribunal in the 
proceedings which give rise to the reference for a preliminary ruling are not strictly 
speaking, of a judicial nature.41
2.3.2 Corbiau 
Although reference had been made in Pretore di Salò to independence as 
one of the conditions for a body to be regarded as a court or tribunal for the 
purposes of Article 234, the judgement in Case C-24/92 Corbiau42 was the 
first to give it its fundamental meaning. 
                                                 
38 Case 14/86 Pretore di Salò v. Persons unknown, [1987] ECR 2545. 
39 Ibid., p. 2566, paras. 1-4.  
40 Ibid., p. 2567, para. 3. 
41 Ibid., p. 2567, para. 4. 
42 Case C-24/92 Pierre Corbiau v. Administration des Contributions du Grand-Duché de 
Luxembourg, [1993] ECR I-1277. The Court was equally categorical in Joined Cases C-
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The background was as follows. In January 1992, the Directeur des 
Contributions Directes et des Accises (Director of Taxation and Excise 
Duties) of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg requested a preliminary ruling 
in the context of a question that had arisen in an administrative appeal 
before him and Mr. Courbiau for the repayment of excessive amounts of 
income tax.43
 
Regarding the question of admissibility, the Court of Justice articulated that 
the expression “court or tribunal” is a concept of Community law, which, by 
its very nature, can only mean an authority acting as a third party in relation 
to the authority which adopted the decision forming the subject matter of the 
proceedings. In this instance, the Court found that the Director of Taxation 
and Excise Duties did not act as such a third party. He had a clear 
organizational link with the departments that made the disputed tax 
assessment, against which the complaint submitted to him was directed. The 
Director of Taxation and Excise Duties was not, therefore, a court or 
tribunal within the meaning of Article 234 of the Treaty.44
2.3.3 Köllensperger and Atzwanger 
In Case C-103/97 Köllensperger and Atzwanger45, the Tiroler 
Landesvergabeamt (Procurement Office of the Land Of Tyrol, Austria, 
herinafter “the Procurement Office”) sought a preliminary ruling based upon 
questions raised in proceedings between Köllensperger and Atwanger and 
the Association of Municipalities for the Schwaz District Hospital 
concerning the award of a contract for works relating to an extension to the 
Schwaz District Hospital.46
 
Ruling on the admissibility of the reference, the ECJ determined that the 
Procurement Office was established by law, its jurisdiction was compulsory, 
it was permanent, its procedure was inter partes, and it applied rules of law. 
Doubt, however, was cast upon whether the condition of independence was 
satisfied. More specifically, the Court found that the Austrian law governing 
that body, which included a passage referring to the cancellation of 
appointments of its members, was too vague, since it did not contain any 
specific provisions on the rejection or withdrawal of members. The ECJ 
found comfort, however, in the fact that the independence of the 
Procurement Office’s members was guaranteed by the application of the 
General Law on Administrative Procedure, which contained very specific 
provisions on member withdraw and expressly prohibited the giving of 
                                                                                                                            
74/95 and C-129/95 Criminal proceedings against X, [1996] ECR I-6609, in which the 
reference for a preliminary ruling had been made by the Procura della Repubblica (Office 
of the Public Prosecutor). The Court declared that it did not have jurisdiction because the 
prosecutor did not fulfil the requirement of independence.   
43 Ibid., p. 1301, paras. 1-2. 
44 Ibid., p. 1304, paras. 15-17. 
45 Case C-103/97 Josef Köllensperger GmbH&Co. KG and Atzwanger AG v. 
Gemeindeverband Bezirkskrankenhaus Schwaz, [1999] ECR I-551. 
46 Ibid., p. 568, paras. 1,2. 
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instructions to members of the Procurement Office in performance of their 
duties. Consequently, the preliminary ruling reference was admissible.47
2.3.4 Gabalfrisa and Others 
Another ruling often cited in current case-law, concerning the independent 
criterion, is Joined Cases C-110/98 to C-147/98 Gabalfrisa and Others48. 
 
 
2.3.4.1 Background and admissibility 
In the judgement, the Court of Justice examined whether the Tribunal 
Económico-Administrativo Regional de Cataluña (Regional Economic and 
Administrative Court, Catlonia, Spain, herinafter “the Regional Court) 
constituted a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 234. The named 
body made a preliminary ruling reference based upon a question raised in 
proceedings between several entrepreneurs/practitioners and various 
departments of the State Tax Administration Agency concerning the 
deduction of value added tax.49
 
Before answering the question referred, the ECJ first determined whether 
the Regional Court had the right to refer questions. Recalling Case C-54/96 
Dorsch Consult50, the Court carefully checked off each of the conditions 
that can be taken into account when making such a determination. First, 
Spanish law provided for the Regional Court and stipulated that it was to 
rule on complaints which were submitted before them. The decisions of the 
tax authority could not be challenged before the administrative courts until 
complaints were first brought before the Regional Court. Consequently, it 
was of statutory origin, permanent, and had compulsory jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, according to Spanish law, the decisions of that body were final 
and binding. As to requirement that the procedure be inter partes, the Court 
reminded that this condition is not an absolute criterion and they were 
satisfied by the fact that the parties could lodge written submissions 
/evidence and request a public hearing. After finding that the Regional Court 
also applied rules of law, the ECJ went on to examine the independence of 
the body. Spanish law stipulated a separation of functions between the 
departments of the tax authority responsible for management, clearance, and 
recovery and, on the other hand, the economic-administrative courts which 
ruled on complaints lodged against the decisions of those departments 
without receiving any instruction from the tax authority. Consequently, the 
European Court of Justice found that the existence of such a safeguard gave 
the Regional Court, unlike the Director of Taxation and Excise Duties in 
Corbiau, the character of a third party in relation to the departments that 
                                                 
47 Ibid., pp. 574, 575, paras. 16-25. 
48 Joined Cases C-110/98 to C-147/98 Gabalfrisa SL and Others v. Agencia Estatal de 
Administración Tributaria, [2000] ECR I-1577. 
49 Ibid., p. 1598, paras. 1, 2. 
50 Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult v. Bundesbaugesellschaft Berling, [1997] ECR I-4961. 
The case is explored in more detail in the last section of this chapter.  
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adopted the decision forming the subject matter of the complaint. In other 
words, it was sufficiently independent to be regarded as a court or tribunal 
for the purposes of Article 234 of the Treaty.51
2.3.4.2 Critique from the Advocate General 
Advocate General Saggio in his Opinion52 wished to deny the Regional 
Court the status of a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 234 of 
the Treaty. First, he articulated that the separation of functions, stipulated in 
Spanish law, did not provide an adequate degree of impartiality. Moreover, 
the Regional Court was incorporated in the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Finance, that is to say, the very authority whose acts taxpayers 
contested before them. The members of the Regional Court were also 
appointed with the approval of the Minister, who had the power to dismiss 
them without abiding by conditions clearly and categorically laid down by 
law.53  
 
Second, the Advocate General was sceptical to the question of whether their 
procedure was inter partes. Recalling earlier case-law, he stated that while 
the condition is not absolute, the Court has admitted references where the 
defendant was not present only if that deficiency was offset by a high level 
of impartiality and independence in the adjudicating body. Furthermore, 
while the parties were able to lodge submissions and evidence in support of 
their claim and to request a public hearing, the Regional Court could grant 
or refuse such a request based on a discretionary assessment that the person 
concerned was expressly precluded by Spanish law from challenging.54
 
Finally, various other considerations were given in support of denying the 
preliminary ruling reference. In short, AG Saggio determined that the 
function of the Regional Court was not judicial in nature and that its 
decisions, were without exception, open to review before the administrative 
courts. Since these courts were able to, upon assessment, make preliminary 
ruling references to the ECJ, there was no danger that EC law would not be 
uniformly applied.55
2.3.5 Schmid 
In Case C-516/99 Schmid56, the Court was referred two questions for a 
preliminary ruling by the Berufungssenat (Fifth Appeal Chamber of the 
Regional Finance Authority for Vienna, Niederösterreich, and Burgenland, 
herinafter “the Fifth Appeal Chamber”). Those questions were raised in the 
course of an appeal brought by Mr. Schmid, resident in Austria, against his 
                                                 
51 Ibid., pp. 1610-1612, paras. 33-41. 
52 Opinion of Advocate General Saggio in Joined Cases C-110/98 to C-147/98 Gabalfrisa 
and Others, [2000] ECR I-1577. 
53 Ibid., pp. 1584, 1585, paras. 15-17. 
54 Ibid. p. 1583, para. 14. 
55 Ibid., pp. 1585-1587, paras. 18, 19. 
56 Case C-516/99 Proceedings brought by Walter Schmid, [2002] ECR I-4573. See also the 
Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Case C-516/99 Schmid, [2002] ECR I-4573, 
where a denial of admissibility was also reached.  
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income tax assessment notice issued by the Regional Finance Authority 
seeking a reduction in the tax on dividends which were paid to him by a 
company established in another Member State.57
 
As to the admissibility of the reference, the European Court of Justice found 
that the criterion of independence was not fulfilled. After reviewing both 
Corbiau and Gabalfrisa and Others, the ECJ stated that an organisational 
and functional link existed between the Fifth Appeal Chamber and the 
Regional Finance Authority. More specifically, two of the five members of 
the former belonged to the latter: the President of the Regional Finance 
Authority, by way of law, could exercise the function of President of the 
Fifth Appeal Chamber and the second member also came from the Regional 
Finance Authority, yet continued to pursue his activities within that 
authority and was, in that capacity, subject to the directions of his superiors. 
Furthermore, the President of the Regional Finance Authority had the power 
to nominate members of the Fifth Appeal Chamber, with no legislative 
provision to prevent him from modifying, at any time and at his discretion, 
its composition. Hence, the Fifth Appeal Chamber’s members could not be 
said to enjoy sufficient safeguards against undue intervention or pressure on 
the part of the executive. Finally, the President of the Regional Finance 
Authority, subject to possible directions from the Finance Minister, could 
bring an appeal against a decision of the Fifth Appeal Chamber and on that 
occasion defend a point of view different from that adopted by the Fifth 
Appeal Chamber of which he was President. Hence, the Court found that the 
Fifth Appeal Chamber of the Regional Finance Authority did not constitute 
a court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 234 of the Treaty. 58
2.3.6 Remarks 
The deduction to be drawn from the above case-law is that a gradual 
relaxation of the requirement that the body should be independent has taken 
place. From having established its fundamental meaning in Corbiau, that a 
body which makes a preliminary ruling reference should act as a third party 
in relation to the authority which adopts the decision forming the subject 
matter of the proceeding, the Court in Köllensperger and Atzwanger and 
Gabalfrisa and Others considered that generic national provisions intended 
to ensure their impartiality and independence were adequate. Despite 
protests in the legal literature and by Advocate Generals, the ECJ has 
overlooked the requirement that the body taking the decision should not be 
linked to the parties and instead focused on the point that its objective 
should be to carry out its task independently and under its own 
responsibility.59
                                                 
57 Ibid., pp.4594, 4595, paras. 1, 2. 
58 Ibid., pp. 4606-4608, paras. 34-44. 
59 Note 11 above, pp. 9452-9455, paras.19-28.  
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2.4 The inter partes criterion: Politi and 
beyond 
Though we have seen in Gabalfrisa and Others, which recalls Dorsch 
Consult, that the inter partes criterion is not absolute, it is, nonetheless, 
important to briefly examine the various cases on the matter. 
 
While Vaassen (née Göbbels) first brought forth the inter partes condition, 
Case 43/71 Politi60 and Case 162/73 Birra Dreher61 made clear that a 
preliminary ruling reference to the Court of Justice is not conditional on 
whether the proceedings are inter partes. The decisive factor is that the body 
seeking the preliminary ruling is exercising the functions of a court or 
tribunal and considers an interpretation of EC law essential for it to reach a 
decision.   
 
In Case 70/77 Simmenthal 62 and Joined Cases C-277/91, C-318/91, and 
C-319/91 Ligur Carni and Others 63, the ECJ articulated that in the interest 
of the proper administration of justice that a question should be referred 
only after hearing both parties. Despite the foregoing, the Court determined 
that it was for the national courts alone to assess the necessity of a reference.  
 
At first glance, it might seem that the ECJ has not attached much 
importance to the inter partes requirement. However, if the facts are studied 
carefully it will be noted that the principle was not absent in the above 
cases. The absence was simply compensated for by the impartiality and 
independence of the bodies concerned. In later judgements, the Court 
nonetheless, seems to have abandoned that course, Gabalfrisa and Others 
and Dorsch Consult being prime examples.  
 
Consequently, the requirement that the procedure be inter partes has lost 
ground and the Court will, in most cases, not assume that a reference for a 
preliminary ruling is inadmissible based solely on the fact that the 
proceedings are undefended.64
                                                 
60 Case 43/71 Politi S.A.S. v. Ministry for Finance of the Italian Republic, [1971] ECR 
1039, in which the referring President of the Tribunale di Torino was hearing a special 
procedure on the basis of the plaintiff’s allegations alone, without any prior discussion 
between the parties. 
61 Case 162/73 Birra Dreher SpA v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, [1974] ECR 
201, in which the question arose in an Italian summary procedure in which the court could 
make an order against the defendant based on the plaintiffs allegations alone, without 
giving him the opportunity to submit his own observations, although afterwards it was 
possible to raise objections to the decision. 
62 Case 70/77 Simmenthal SpA v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, [1978] ECR 
1453, in which the reference was made by the Pretura di Alessandria in collection 
proceedings in which the court gave judgement on the sole basis of plaintiff allegations. 
63 Joined Cases C-277/91, C-318/91, and C-319/91 Ligur Carni Srl and Others v. Unità 
Sanitaria Local No. XV di Genova and Others, [1993] ECR I-6621, in which questions 
were referred by the President of the Tribunale di Genova in proceedings for the adoption 
of interim measures. 
64 Note 11 above, paras. 29-38. 
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2.5 Compulsory jurisdiction: Nordsee, 
Danfoss, & Almelo and Others 
One of the factors defining a court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 
234 of the Treaty is whether its jurisdiction is compulsory. That left 
arbitration tribunals out of the picture.  
 
In Case 102/81 Nordsee65, a German arbitrator, settling a dispute between 
several German shipbuilders, sought a preliminary ruling. While the Court 
noted that there existed similarities between the activities of an arbitration 
tribunal and those of an ordinary court or tribunal, those characteristics did 
not suffice to give the arbitrator the status of a court or tribunal within the 
meaning of Article 234. More specifically, the parties were under no 
obligation to refer their disputes to arbitration. If questions of Community 
law were raised in arbitration resorted to by agreement, the ordinary courts 
could be called upon to examine them either in the context of their 
collaboration with arbitration tribunals or in the course of reviewing the 
arbitration award.66
 
On the other hand, in Case 109/88 Danfoss67, the Court ruled the Faflige 
Voldgiftsret (a Danish industrial arbitration board) to constitute a court or 
tribunal. In particular, comfort was found in the fact that Danish law granted 
the industrial arbitration board final jurisdiction, the jurisdiction did not 
depend upon the parties’ agreements − since either could bring a case before 
the board irrespective of the objections of the others, and the composition of 
the industrial arbitration board was not within the parties’ discretion68
 
Finally, in Case C-393/92 Almelo and Others69, the European Court of 
Justice was asked to determine whether a national court or tribunal which 
determined an appeal against an arbitration award was to be regarded as a 
court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 234 of the Treaty if under the 
arbitration agreement made between the parties it was to give judgement 
according to what appears fair and reasonable.70 The Court answered 
affirmatively and gave the following reasoning: 
 
It follows from the principles of the primacy of Community law and of its uniform 
application, in conjunction with Article 5 of the Treaty, that a court of a Member State to 
which an appeal against an arbitration award is made pursuant to national law, even where 
                                                 
65 Case 102/81 Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v. Reederei Mond 
Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & Co. KG and Reederei Friedrich Busse Hochseefischerei 
Nordstern AG & Co. KG, [1982] ECR 1095. 
66 Ibid., pp. 1108-1111, paras. 1, 2, 10, 11, 14.  
67 Case 109/88 Handels- og Kontorfuntionærernes Forbund i Danmark v. Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on the behalf of Danfoss, [1989] ECR 3199. 
68 Ibid., pp. 3324, 3325, paras. 7-9. 
69 Case C-393/92 Municipality of Almelo and Others v. Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij NV, [1994] 
ECR I-1477. See also Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v. Benetton International 
NV, [1999] ECR I-3055, in which the Court of Justice again accepted several questions 
referred for a preliminary ruling in the context of an appeal against an arbitration award. 
70 Ibid., p. 1514, para. 20. 
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it gives judgement having regard to fairness, observes the rules of Community law, in 
particular those relating to competition71
2.6 The Court’s current position: the 
legacy of Dorsch Consult 
As we have seen, beginning with Vaassen (née Göbbels) and being refined 
throughout time, the Court can take a number of criteria into account when 
defining a court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 234 of the Treaty. In 
particular: whether law establishes the body, whether it is permanent, 
whether it applies rules of law, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, 
whether it is independent, whether its procedure is inter partes, and whether 
its final decision is judicial in nature. Nonetheless, these criteria serve only 
as a road map and the European Court of Justice has the final say in the 
matter. Consequently, the ECJ has not always adopted a consistent approach 
in its jurisprudence, opting for admissibility in questionable cases. Despite 
what may seem as a somewhat “pick and choose” methodology, Case C-
54/96 Dorsch Consult72 is a leading authority, cited consistently in recent 
case-law, concerning the Court’s current position on the matter. A further 
examination of the judgement is thus necessary. 
 
As to the background, by order of 5 February 1996, the 
Vergabeüberwachungsausschuß des Bundes (Federal Public Procurement 
Awards Supervisory Board, hereinafter “the Federal Supervisory Board) 
referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling a question raised in 
proceedings between Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellshcaft mbH and a 
contract awarding authority concerning a procedure for the award of a 
service contract. On 28 June 1995, the awarding authority published in the 
Official Journal of the European Communities a notice advertising the 
award of a contract for architectural and construction engineering services. 
Dorsch Consult bid for the contract and was informed that its proposal was 
the most advantageous economically, yet was not chosen by the contract 
awarding authority. Disappointed with the decision, Dorsch Consult sought 
to have the contract-awarding procedure stopped and the contract awarded 
to it by the Federal Ministry for Regional Planning, Building and Urban 
Planning, the body responsible for reviewing public procurement awards. 
The latter found that it had no power to review the award of contracts when 
they relate to services and Dorsch Consult appealed before the Federal 
Supervisory Board that the review body had wrongly declined jurisdiction. 
In turn, the Federal Supervisory Board suspended proceedings and sought 
the guidance of the ECJ.73
 
Before the question submitted by the Federal Supervisory Board was 
addressed, it was necessary to determine whether the body was to be 
                                                 
71 Ibid., p. 1515, para 23. Article 5 is currently Article 10.  
72 Note 50 above. 
73 Ibid., pp. 4984-4987, paras. 1-7. 
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regarded as a court or tribunal under Article 234. Recalling earlier case-law, 
the Court began its reasoning.74   
 
Contrary to the Commission’s arguments, the Court determined that the 
Federal Supervisory Board was established by law and was permanent. 
German law provided for the establishment of the body and it was deemed 
immaterial that domestic legislation had not conferred upon it powers in the 
specific area of public service contracts.75  
 
As regards the question of compulsory jurisdiction, the Commission 
submitted that the Federal Supervisory Board did not fulfil the criterion, a 
condition, which, in its view, could mean two things: either that the parties 
were required to apply to the relevant review body for settlement of their 
dispute or that determinations of that body were to be binding. The 
Commission, adopting the second interpretation, concluded that German 
legislation did not provide for the determinations made by the Federal 
Supervisory Board to be enforceable. Shooting down the Commission’s 
arguments, the Court of Justice concluded that German law established the 
Federal Supervisory Board as the only body for reviewing the legality of 
determinations made by review bodies. Moreover, when they found such 
determinations to be unlawful, they directed the relevant review body to 
make a fresh determination in conformity with the Federal Supervisory 
Board’s findings on points of law. Hence, compulsory jurisdiction and 
binding decisions of a judicial nature existed in the eyes of the Court.76  
 
The Commission also stated that, according to the Federal Supervisory 
Board’s own evidence, procedure before the entity was not inter partes. The 
European Court reiterated that the requirement that the procedure be inter 
partes was not an absolute criterion, adding that the parties were indeed 
heard before any determination was made.77  
 
Moving on to the application of rules of law criterion, the Court found that 
the Federal Supervisory Board was required to apply provisions governing 
the award of public contracts, laid down in Community directives and 
domestic regulations adopted to transpose them.78  
 
Finally, both Dorsch Consult and the Commission considered that the 
Federal Supervisory Board was not independent. They pointed out that it 
was linked to the organizational structure of the Bundeskartellamt − which 
was itself subject to supervision by the Ministry for Economic Affairs, that 
the term of office of the chairman and the official assessors were not fixed, 
                                                 
74 Ibid., p. 4992, paras. 22-23. At para. 23 the Court acknowledged the judgements in Case 
61/65 Vaassen (neé Göbbels), [1966] ECR 2612; Case 14/86 Pretore di Salò, [1987] ECR 
2545, para.7; Case 109/88 Danfoss, [1989] ECR 3199, paras. 7, 8; Case C-393/92 Almelo 
and Others, [1994] ECR I-1477; and Case C-111/94 Job Centre, [1995] ECR I-3361, para 
9, as exemplifying their current position as to what may constitute a court or tribunal. 
75 Ibid., p. 4993, paras 24-26. 
76 Ibid., pp. 4993, 4994, 4996 paras. 27-29, 37. 
77 Ibid., p. 4994, paras. 30, 31. 
78 Ibid., p. 4995, para. 33.  
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and that the provisions guaranteeing impartiality applied only to lay 
members. The Court observed that, according to domestic legislation, the 
Federal Supervisory Board was to carry out its task impartially, 
independently, and under its own responsibility, subject only to observance 
of the law.79  
 
For those reasons, the Federal Supervisory board was deemed a court or 
tribunal for the purposes of Article 234 of the Treaty, so that the question it 
had referred was admissible. Overall, a rather lenient attitude taken by the 
Court, yet, upon reflection, the admissibility ruling was, in my opinion, on 
par with earlier jurisprudence on the matter.  
 
 
                                                 
79 Ibid., pp. 4995, paras. 35-36.  
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3 An Advocate General’s 
concern regarding the Court’s 
approach 
Having relayed, in the previous chapter, the Court’s definition of a court or 
tribunal within the meaning of Article 234, let us, in the interest of letting 
both sides be heard, explore Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer’s 
discouragement with the Court’s approach. 
 
In his Opinion80, AG Colomer reviewed the various judgements, most of 
which are to be found in Chapter 2, where the Court set the tone as to what 
can constitute a court or tribunal for the purposes of a preliminary ruling 
reference. He delivered the following hard-hitting conclusion: 
 
(…) the Treaty does not define the term “national court or tribunal”. Nor does the Court of 
Justice, which has merely laid down a number of criteria for guidance, such as whether the 
body is established by law, whether it is permanent and independent, whether its 
jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether the decision is of 
a judicial nature, and whether it applies rules of law. 
 
The result is case-law which is too flexible and not sufficiently consistent, with the lack of 
legal certainty which that entails. The profound contradictions noted between the solutions 
proposed by the Advocates General in their Opinions and those adopted by the Court of 
Justice in its judgements illustrate that the path is badly signposted and there is therefore a 
risk of getting lost. The case-law is casuistic, very elastic and not very scientific, with such 
vague outlines that a question referred by Sancho Panza as governor of the island of 
Barataria would be accepted.81
 
Adding fuel to the just named, he proceeded to show, through a review of 
the Court’s jurisprudence, how the requirement that the body should be 
independent has gradually been relaxed, the inter partes criterion has 
diminished in importance, and the final decision of a judicial nature 
requirement adds only further confusion to the equation.82
 
As a direct consequence of his observations, AG Colomer was of the 
opinion that, since Article 234 of Treaty is fundamentally essential to the 
construction and consolidation of the Community legal order, the ground 
rules concerning the Court’s jurisdiction must be clearly defined in a 
Community governed by rule of law. Both the national courts and 
Community citizens are entitled to know who may be deemed a court or 
tribunal under Article 234. He added that in order to further the uniform 
dissemination and application of Community law, in the early years of its 
development, the Court of Justice was justified in encouraging the use of the 
preliminary ruling procedure by using a broad interpretation of the 
                                                 
80 Note 11 above. 
81 Ibid., pp. 9450, 9451, paras. 13, 14. 
82 Ibid., pp. 9452-9461, paras. 19-47. 
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definition of a court or tribunal. However, what was previously clearly 
justified is today disturbing and a hinder to the work of the Court. 
Therefore, the Advocate General stated that, “as Community law now 
stands, there is a need to tighten the definition of a court or tribunal of a 
Member State, to bring together its various components to provide a precise 
frame of reference and so to prevent uncertainty from becoming a 
permanent feature of this sphere”.83
 
Proposing a new definition of a court or tribunal under Article 234 of the 
Treaty, AG Colomer articulated that it would be unsettling if the 
preliminary ruling procedure would be made available to bodies that do not 
give judgements, in other words executive bodies whose decisions are open 
to review by judicial bodies. First, Article 234 introduces an instrument of 
judicial cooperation, a dialogue by courts and between courts. Second, the 
Advocate General added that the judicial body which reviews an 
administrative decision adopted on the basis of the reply given by the Court 
of Justice may consider that it was unnecessary to make the reference or that 
it should have been approached from another point of view. Consequently, 
if a judicial body, reviewing a decision of an executive body, decides that 
neither the interpretation nor the application of rules of Community law are 
at issue in the point, the reference for a preliminary ruling and the 
time/expense invested will have been utterly pointless, with the added 
disadvantage that the legitimacy of the Court’s judgments is undermined. 
On the other hand, if the reviewing body considers that the question should 
have been formulated differently, two options are available: it could in 
theory seek a new preliminary reference or for reasons of procedural 
economy find it better to just let be. In short, he determined that the 
acceptance of references for preliminary rulings by administrative bodies 
deprives the “real judicial body” to a large extent the right to use the 
procedure, seriously hinders the dialogue between courts established by the 
Treaty, distorts its aim, and undermines the judicial protection of the 
Community citizen.84
 
In order to avoid such a situation, the Advocate General maintained that as a 
general rule the bodies which form part of the national court systems are 
always courts or tribunals under Article 234, with the reservation that the 
referring body must act in the capacity of an independent court or tribunal 
and have a dispute between litigants before it that it is called upon to settle 
by interpreting and applying legal rules. In short, it must be exercising its 
judicial powers. As an exception to the general rule, Advocate General 
Colomer was willing to accept that the Court of Justice should allow, for 
reasons of effective legal protection, the questions referred for a preliminary 
ruling by a body that does not form part of the national court system, when 
the referring body has the last word in the national legal order. Such an 
exception was, however, to be made strictly on the condition that the Court 
                                                 
83 Ibid., pp. 9464, 9465, paras. 61, 63, 64 
84 Ibid., pp. 9468-9470, paras. 75, 76, 78-80. 
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of Justice adheres rigorously to the criteria of independence and adversarial 
proceedings.85  
 
According to Colomer, the central advantage to his approach was that it was 
more straightforward and had the virtue of rendering much clearer results 
than seen in the Court’s previous case-law. With regard to preliminary 
ruling questions referred by bodies that form part of the court system of a 
Member State, the ECJ would only need to confirm that they were acting in 
the exercise of their power to give judgment. On the other hand, if the 
question came from a body that is not part of that system, the Court would 
first have to determine whether the entity’s decision lacked further judicial 
review and then meticulously check that it fulfils the criteria characterising a 
body which exercises a function of a judicial nature. A second advantage, 
according to the Advocate General, was that his proposal would effectively 
reduce the number of references for preliminary rulings. He was highly 
concerned that a significant increase in the number of cases before the Court 
could adversely affect the uniform application of Community law, which 
Article 234 of the Treaty purports to safeguard.86   
 
Obviously, the Court in Case C-17/00 De Coster87 did not agree with his 
recommendations and, adopting yet another liberal attitude, allowed the 
reference for a preliminary ruling. Moreover, since this short section can in 
no way do Advocate General Colomer’s arguments the justice they so 
rightfully deserve, I would like to recommend that those with further 
interest on the topic take the time to read his revealing Opinion in its 
entirety.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
85 Ibid., pp. 9471-9476, paras. 83-95.  
86 Ibid., p. 9476, paras. 96, 97. 
87 Case C-17/00 François De Coster v. Collège des bourgemestre et échevins de 
Watermael-Boitsfort, [2001] ECR I-9445. 
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4 The Opinion of Advocate 
General Jacobs in Syfait 
A plausible consensus, based on my own review of the case-law and the 
critique of various Advocate Generals, is that the Court has adopted, under 
certain circumstances, a rather liberal approach when determining which 
bodies constitute a court or tribunal for the purposes of a preliminary ruling 
reference. While certain criteria exist as guidance as to what constitutes a 
court or tribunal, the Court has in several rulings accepted vague assurances 
that these are fulfilled, possibly with regard to the important role 
preliminary rulings play for the application of Community law. The Opinion 
of AG Jacobs in Case C-53/03 Syfait88, delivered on 28 October 2004, is one 
such ruling that incorporates all of the just named. Consequently, in the 
service of legal research, this section will relay the decision on 
admissibility, analyze its correctness, and conclude with a discussion on its 
implications. 
4.1 Background and admissibility 
In the case, the Epitropi Antagonismou (Greek Competition Commission) 
referred to the ECJ preliminary questions concerning whether and in what 
circumstances a dominant pharmaceutical company may, in order to limit 
the parallel trade in its products, refuse to meet in full the orders that it 
receives from pharmaceutical wholesalers. Causing quite a stir in both the 
legal and business communities, AG Jacobs reached the conclusion that 
such conduct does not automatically constitute an abuse within the meaning 
of Article 82 of the Treaty if it can be objectively justified. While not legally 
binding on the Court, a future positive ruling on this matter by the ECJ will 
have important consequences for certain pharmaceutical corporations 
conducting business within the Community.89  
 
Not downplaying the importance of the above potential implications, a more 
relevant aspect brought forth in the case is whether the Greek Competition 
Commission constituted a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 
234. AG Jacobs answered the question in the positive. The following will 
provide for his reasoning. 
 
As to the admissibility of the reference, according to Article 234(2) of the 
Treaty, only a court or tribunal of a Member State may refer questions to the 
Court of Justice for preliminary ruling and it is clear from the Court’s case- 
law that the concept of “court or tribunal” is one of Community law.90  
                                                 
88 Note 6 above. 
89 Hull, David W., Parallel trade in pharmaceutical products in Europe: The Advocate 
General’s Opinion in Syfait v GlaxoSmithKline, Competition Law Insight, 9 November 
2004, pp. 3-6, www.cov.com/publications/download/oid48041/504.pdf.  
90 Note 6 above, para. 17. 
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As examined in the previous chapters, several criteria exist in the Court’s 
jurisprudence as being relevant to the assessment whether a given entity 
constitutes a court or tribunal within then meaning of Article 234. More 
specifically, these include whether law establishes the body, whether it is 
permanent, whether it applies rule of law, whether its jurisdiction is 
compulsory, whether it is independent, whether its procedure is inter 
partes91, and whether its final decision is judicial in nature92. The Greek 
Competition Commission, the European Commission, and GlaxoSmithKline 
were unanimously of the view that the body in question met the named 
criteria. Two sets of complainants contested the admissibility of the 
reference in their written submissions, yet one of these later changed its 
position and accepted that the Greek Competition Commission could refer 
questions under Article 234 of the Treaty. The Swedish Government made 
no submissions as to the admissibility of the reference.93  
 
AG Jacobs, after an analysis of the information supplied in the order for 
reference, agreed that the Greek Competition Commission clearly satisfied 
many of the criteria that the Court has in the past identified as relevant when 
considering whether a given body may be classified as a court or tribunal. 
More specifically, he determined the following:  
 
● The Greek Competition Commission was permanently established by 
Article 8 of Law 703/77 on the control of monopolies and oligopolies and 
protection of free competition as the body which was competent for 
ensuring observance of the provisions of that law;  
 
● it reached its decisions by applying both domestic and Community 
competition norms; 
 
● and, its jurisdiction was compulsory since it had the sole competence to 
impose penalties provided for by Law 703/77.94
 
AG Jacobs was, nonetheless, of the opinion that the factors thus far 
considered, while probably necessary for any judicial authority, would 
equally apply to an administrative enforcement agency. He reasoned that 
more distinctive of a court or tribunal was the fact that both complainants 
and respondents had the option of being legally represented and were 
accorded procedural rights in hearings before the Greek Competition 
                                                 
91 See, in particular, the judgments in Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult Ingenieursgesellschaft 
[1997] ECR I-4961, at paragraph 23 and the case law cited therein: Joined Cases C-110/98 
to C-147/98 Gabalfrisa and Others [2000] ECR I-1577, at paragraph 33, and Case C-
516/99 Schmid [2002] ECR I-4573, at paragraph 34. All the above rulings are provided for 
in Chapter 2 of the thesis. 
92 See the order in Case C-138/80 Borker [1980] ECR 1975, at paragraph 4, and the 
judgements in Case C-111/94 Job Centre [1995] ECR I-3361, at paragraph 9, and Case C-
182/00 Lutz and Others [2002] ECR I-547, at paragraphs 15 and 16. These judgments are 
also found in Chapter 2 of the thesis.  
93 Note 6 above, paras. 18, 19. 
94 Ibid., para. 20. 
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Commission. In AG Jacobs view, such guarantees reasonably fulfilled the 
inter partes criterion.95
 
Despite having identified certain characteristics that aided in allowing the 
Greek Competition Commission to classify as a court or tribunal within the 
meaning of Article 234, Advocate General Jacobs felt the need to elaborate 
upon whether the entity’s structure and composition was consonant with 
those of an independent judicial authority.96  
 
As far as the composition of the Greek Competition Commission was 
concerned, it consisted of nine members appointed by the Minister of 
Development for a three-year period. The Minister chose four of the 
members from lists of three candidates supplied to him by trade and 
industry bodies. The remaining five members were as follows: one member 
from the State Legal Service or other high judicial officer, two academics − 
one a lawyer and the other an economist, and two persons of acknowledged 
repute and relevant experience. Moreover, Article 8(1) of Law 703/77 
expressly designated the Greek Competition Commission as an 
“independent authority”. Attached to the just named was a secretariat with 
the task of investigating cases arising before the former and making written 
proposals as to how they should be resolved. According to the President of 
the Greek Competition Commission and the Greek Competition 
Commission, the secretariat was a fully independent entity, since the 
President acted as the secretariat’s administrative superior only when it 
came to the exercise of certain disciplinary powers and neither the President 
nor the Greek Competition Commission was involved in the secretariat’s 
proposals.97
 
Having reviewed the above structure and composition, Jacobs had two 
specific doubts. First, he was of the view that it was relevant when assessing 
whether a body was judicial in nature to consider how many of its 
appointees possessed qualifications as lawyers and judges. To this regard, 
the Greek Competition Commission had only two lawyers out of nine total 
members and there existed no legal guarantees that the President of the 
Greek Competition Commission would be legally qualified. AG Jacobs 
argued that such a limited number of posts specifically assigned to lawyers 
raised certain doubts as to the Greek Competition Commission’s designation 
as a court or tribunal. Despite his initial reservation, he concluded that the 
limited number of posts reserved for lawyers or judges was not sufficient to 
rule out its judicial status. The Advocate General found consolation in the 
following: 
 
● Persons of acknowledged repute with experience in national and 
Community economic law and competition policies were to hold two further 
positions; 
                                                 
95 Ibid., para. 21. 
96 Ibid., para. 22.  
97 Ibid., paras. 23-25. 
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● all the representatives on the body were described in the order for 
reference as having acknowledged experience with regard to competition 
law and were bound to exercise their duties in accordance with the law; 
 
● and, it could be reasonably expected to have a lower proportion of 
personnel holding purely legal qualifications on a judicial body charged 
with operating in a complex technical field such as competition law.98
 
The Advocate General’s second doubt concerned the structural links 
between the Greek Competition Commission and its secretariat. Recalling 
the ECJ’s ruling in Gabalfrisa and Others99, the operational separation 
between a judicial body and an administrative body establishes judicial 
independence. In that case, the European Court of Justice allowed a 
reference from a regional body in Spain responsible for the hearing of fiscal 
complaints partly on the basis that a separation existed between its functions 
and those of the State Tax Administration Agency whose departments 
adopted the decision forming the subject matter of the complaint. In the 
present case, AG Jacobs stated that only if the secretariat had the necessary 
degree of separation from the Greek Competition Commission could it 
qualify as a third party independent of both the party being investigated and 
of the Greek Competition Commission as a judge. To this regard, the 
Advocate General noted that, according to the order for reference, the 
President of the Greek Competition Commission could not influence 
investigations conducted by the secretariat. Nonetheless, he was sceptical of 
the President’s role as the secretariat’s administrative superior in the 
exercise of certain disciplinary powers and the fact that no mention was 
made of any concrete rules or safeguards designed to guarantee the 
investigatory independence of the secretariat. AG Jacobs was of the opinion 
that the just named situated the Greek Competition Commission 
precariously close to that of an administrative authority with certain judicial 
characteristics. On balance, however, the Advocate General found that it 
was of sufficient judicial character to qualify as a court or tribunal for the 
purposes of Article 234. First, he articulated that it was not likely that the 
exercise of disciplinary powers by the President of the Greek Competition 
Commission over the secretariat could influence the latter’s investigations. 
Second, Advocate General Jacobs concluded that any threat to the 
operational separation of the secretariat’s investigations was to some degree 
protected by the Greek Competition Commission’s hearings, since the 
parties by way of their own submissions in the inter partes proceedings 
ensured fair decisions.100
 
                                                 
98 Ibid., para 26. While I am not absolutely sure as to the relevance of the number of 
members possessing strict legal qualifications in the Greek Competition Commission, 
Advocate General Colomer in his Opinion in Case C-17/00 De Coster also articulated on  
the legal qualifications of members of administrative bodies in his quest to deny such 
entities the right to make use of Article 234, note 11 above, pp. 9469, para. 77.    
99 Note 48 above.  
100 Note 6 above, paras. 27-34. 
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Having found all the criteria fulfilled as to what constitutes a court or 
tribunal for the purpose of Article 234 of the Treaty, the Advocate General 
added an array of further arguments for the admissibility of the reference. 
First, in Case C-67/91 Asociación Española de Banca Privada and 
Others101, the Court admitted a reference from a competition authority, 
notably the Spanish Tribunal for the Defence of Competition. The body 
shared many of the same attributes as the Greek Competition Commission, 
since it too was a permanent body established by law with responsibility for 
applying competition rules following an adversarial procedure and it acted 
after receiving a report from a separate body. Second, Article 35 of 
Regulation 1/2003102 recognises that Member States have the possibility of 
conferring the tasks of a competition authority upon bodies having judicial 
characteristics, and Article 35(4) of the same Regulation preserves the 
independence of such bodies. Third, AG Jacobs took the view that judicial 
economy considerations could favour allowing a reference at the earliest 
possible stage. In essence, such a system might potentially eliminate the 
need for subsequent proceedings before a reviewing court in order to make 
an admissible preliminary ruling reference. He added that a specialised 
competition authority having judicial characteristics might be better placed 
to identify the relevant issues of Community competition law than a 
generalist court charged with reviewing the decisions of the former body at 
a subsequent stage. Fourth, regarding the decentralisation of Community 
competition law brought on by Regulation 1, Advocate General Jacobs 
reasoned that the possibility for judicially structured competition authorities 
to refer questions to the ECJ would improve the uniform application of 
Community law under such a system. Finally, following from the ruling in 
Case C-198/01 CIF103, national competition authorities are obliged to 
disapply national legislation which requires or facilitates conduct contrary to 
Article 81(1), or which reinforces the effects of such conduct, specifically 
with regard to price fixing or market sharing arrangements. AG Jacobs 
reasoned that such a possibility provided further argumentation for a 
generous approach towards references from such authorities, in order to 
ensure that any uncertainties as to the applicable Community rules were 
clarified before national legislation was disapplied.104
 
Based on all the above, Advocate General Jacobs reached his final 
conclusion that the Greek Competition Commission was a court or tribunal 
within the meaning of Article 234 of the Treaty. The order for reference was 
admissible and Jacobs proceeded to consider the substantive issues raised by 
the body. 
                                                 
101 Case C-67/91 Dirreción General de Defensa de la Competencia v. Asociación Española 
de Banca Privada (AEB) and Others, [1992] ECR I-4785. 
102 Note 5 above. 
103 Case C-198/01 Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) v. Autorità Garante della 
Concorrenza e del Mercato, [2003] ECR I-8055. 
104 Note 6 above, paras. 35, 44, 45. 
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4.2 A correct Opinion? 
While Advocate Generals often have impeccable knowledge in the workings 
of Community law, that is not to say they are free from fault. Hence, the 
goal of this section is to analyze briefly what I see as both correct and 
incorrect judgement calls made on behalf of AG Jacobs in his quest to allow 
the Greek Competition Commission the use of the preliminary ruling 
procedure. 
 
To begin with, I would like to commend Advocate General Jacobs for not 
straying in the least bit from the Court’s earlier jurisprudence defining a 
court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 234 – he too seems a loyal 
follower of the ECJ’s rather liberal attitude on the matter. Consequently, I 
can do nothing more than fully agree with his conclusions that the Greek 
Competition Commission is established by law, its jurisdiction is 
compulsory, and it reaches decision through an application of domestic and 
Community competition law. As to the procedure before the Greek 
Competition being inter partes, one must recall that this is not an absolute 
criterion and that they allow both complainants and respondents the right to 
take part in their decision-making process. 
 
As to the question of the Greek Competition Commission being 
independent, this is where AG Jacobs arguments and my own opinion 
collide. In what he calls a borderline scenario, he nonetheless opts to find 
that criterion to be reasonably fulfilled. While Greek law designates the 
body and its members as being independent, the order for reference states 
that the secretariat’s investigations are without outside influence, and the 
Advocate General seems just a little concerned with the exercise of 
disciplinary power by the Commission’s President over the secretariat, I 
strongly disagree with previous Court rulings that vague national provisions 
providing for independence actually ensure independence.105  Moreover, AG 
Jacob’s argument that operational separation between the two bodies is 
sufficiently guarded against by the inter partes hearings before the Greek 
Competition Commission is rather weak and a quick fix at most. By using 
that argument and relying too readily on the Court’s liberal jurisprudence on 
the issue, the Advocate General is guilty of free-thought treason. 
 
In total agreement with Advocate General Colomer, “independence is not a 
fortuitous, but an inherent, element of the judicial function”. Independence 
must not only be presented externally through legislative measures, but also 
internally in a body’s organizational structure.106 I am not the least bit 
convinced this can be said of the Greek Competition Commission and its 
secretariat. While Regulation 1 recognises the possibility of conferring the 
tasks of a competition authority upon bodies having judicial characteristics 
and AG Jacobs reasons that their right to make use of Article 234 of the 
                                                 
105 See Case C-103/97 Köllensperger and Atzwanger and Case C-147/98 Gabalfrisa and 
Others, Note 45 and 48 above. 
106 Note 11 above, p. 9474, para. 92.  
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Treaty could improve the uniform application of Articles 81 and 82, one 
cannot simply, for those reasons, pretend that full independence exists. 
Moreover, as we will see in a later section, it not entirely certain that 
allowing certain NCAs the right to refer questions to the Court will have the 
above named effect. 
 
In conclusion, while Advocate General Jacobs has delivered an Opinion that 
is consistent with the Court’s earlier jurisprudence, it is my sincere hope that 
the European Court of Justice takes a step back from their previous 
liberalism and denies the admissibility of the Greek Competition 
Commission’s reference. 
4.3 The potential implications of Syfait 
According to Article 222 of the Treaty, the main task of an Advocate 
General is to make impartial and independent submissions on cases brought 
before the Court of Justice, in order to assist the Court in the performance of 
their task. While these submissions, in the form of Opinions, are not binding 
upon the Judges of the Court, they still provide both legalists and scholars 
with valuable insight into the workings of Community law. Hence, this 
section is only theoretical in nature, realisation of its conclusions being 
dependent upon a future green light by the European Court of Justice. 
4.3.1 Background: the role of national courts 
and competition authorities under Regulation 
1/2003 
In order to gain a better understanding of the potential implications of Syfait, 
a brief summary of the national competition authorities’ new role under 
Regulation 1 is warranted. Let us begin. 
 
For roughly four decades, Council Regulation 17 of 6 February 1962107 had 
allowed a Community competition policy to develop that had helped to 
anchor a common competition culture within the EC. However, in light of a 
future Member State enlargement and a completed Common Market, the 
time was deemed ripe to replace that legislation.108 On 1 May 2004 that 
dream was realized with the entering into force of Council Regulation 
1/2003 and six Commission Notices109, a.k.a “The Modernization Package”.  
                                                 
107 Council Regulation 17/62 first regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 
[1962] OJ L13/204. Articles 85 and 86 are currently Articles 81 and 82. 
108 Note 5 above, para. 1 of the Preamble section. 
109 The Notices are as follows: Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of 
Competition Authorities, [2004] OJ C103/43; Commission Notice on the co-operation 
between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member States in the application of 
Articles 81 and 82 EC, [2004] OJ C101/54; Commission Notice on the handling of 
complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, [2004] OJ 
C101/65; Commission Notice on informal guidance relating to novel questions concerning 
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty that arise in individual cases (guidance letters), [2004] 
OJ C101/78; Commission Notice Guidelines on the effect on trade concept in Articles 81 
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The fundamental changes brought by Regulation 1 were as follows: 
 
● The obligation to notify an agreement or business practice to the 
Commission, which was previously an absolute condition for obtaining an 
exemption under Article 81(3) EC, was abolished. Consequently, 
agreements caught by Article 81(1) of the Treaty that satisfy the conditions 
of Article 81(3) EC shall not be prohibited, no prior decision to that effect 
being required.110  
 
● By way of this directly applicable exemption system, the national 
competition authorities and courts have the power to apply not only Article 
81(1) and Article 82 of the Treaty, which already had direct applicability by 
virtue of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 
but also Article 81(3) of the Treaty. In other words, national competition 
authorities and courts are to decide whether the conditions of Article 81(3) 
EC are satisfied each time they confirm an agreement to be restrictive of 
competition within the meaning of Article 81(1) of the Treaty.111
 
● In all cases that have an effect on trade between Member States, the EC 
competition rules will be applied. Where a case falls inside the scope of 
application of Articles 81 and 82, Member States’ courts and competition 
authorities will not be able to base their decisions solely on national law. 
Under Regulation 1, they have an obligation to apply the EC competition 
rules, at least alongside national rules or alternatively Articles 81 and 82 EC 
on a stand-alone basis.112  
 
Put simply, the enforcement of Community competition law is currently 
decentralized through a three-tier application (national courts, national 
competition authorities, and the Commission) of Articles 81 and 82  in their 
entirety. The goal is to increase Member State involvement in the fight 
against restrictive agreements with a Community dimension and to allow 
the Commission to concentrate more resources on serious infringements of 
the EC competition provisions.113
4.3.2 The positive and negatives of allowing 
national competition authorities the right to use 
Article 234 
Being the optimist that I am, let us first see to the positive in allowing 
national competition authorities to send a reference to the Court. 
 
                                                                                                                            
and 82 of the Treaty, [2004] OJ C101/81; and Commission Notice on the application of 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty, [2004] C101/97. Regulation 1 and the named Notices can be 
found on www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation. 
110 Note 5 above, Article 1. 
111 Ibid., Articles 1-3 read together. 
112 Ibid., Article 3. 
113 Ibid., paras. 3, 4 of the Preamble section. 
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As mentioned above, Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty are as of May 2004 to 
be applied in their entirety by the national competition regimes, currently 25 
Member States’ courts and competition authorities, each with varying 
experience in their usage. Consequently, due to the relative difficult 
application of those provisions and the large number of actors reaching 
decisions on their basis, a widely forthcoming argument is that such a 
system presents potential risks to the uniform application of those 
provisions. While Community legislators have placed certain safeguards in 
place − such as the creation of the European Competition Network 
(comprising the Commission and all the Member States’ competition 
authorities), Chapter IV of Regulation 1 on cooperation between the 
national bodies and the Commission, and the various Commission Notices − 
a risk for inconsistency looms, nonetheless, precariously close. 
 
Consequently, by allowing NCAs, with certain judicial characteristics, the 
opportunity to seek the advice of the European Court of Justice could 
provide an additional safeguard to ensure that Articles 81 and 82 are applied 
in a correct and uniform manner. Nonetheless, as David W. Hull pointed out 
in the November 2004 issue of Competition Law Insight, “ although a 
liberal interpretation of court or tribunal that makes it easier for competition 
authorities to seek guidance from the ECJ is a welcome step in promoting 
uniformity, it may be difficult to achieve any real measure of uniformity in 
the absence of a right of appeal to the ECJ on points of EU competition 
law”.114 It was also acknowledged to a certain extent in the White Paper, 
which noted that Article 234 of the Treaty represents a “slow way of 
maintaining or restoring consistency in competition policy”.115 Moreover, 
there is a very significant divergence in the manner in which Article 234 has 
been applied by the Member States. For example, in certain countries 
Article 234 is hardly ever invoked, whereas in other countries there has been 
a significant and effective use of the procedure. Based on the above, it can 
be seriously questioned whether undue reliance on Article 234 as a means of 
implementing consistent Community competition policy would be 
effective.116    
 
Regarding the negative aspects, I suggest these are two fold. First, by 
allowing certain NCAs the right to seek preliminary ruling references will 
further increase the workload of an already overburdened ECJ. Since its 
establishment, Article 234 references have been on a steady rise and 
currently consume a large share of the Court’s resources. The establishment 
of the Court of First Instance in 1989 and the Nice Treaty’s amendments to 
Article 225117 have done something to alleviate the workload, but not 
                                                 
114 Note 89 above, p. 4.  
115 White Paper on the modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the 
EC Treaty, [1999] Official Journal C132/1, para. 104. Articles 85 and 86 are now Articles 
81 and 82. 
116 Kon, Stephen, The Commission’s White Paper: the need for procedural harmonisation, 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute: International Antitrust Law and Policy, Chapter 13, pp. 
245, 246. 
117 Article 225(1) of the Treaty now provides that the CFI can hear actions covered by 
Articles 230, 232, 235, 236, and 238, with the exceptions of those cases assigned to a 
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enough in the long term.118 We have yet to feel the full impact of 15 new 
Member States seeking preliminary ruling references, are we also prepared 
to open the floodgates for NCAs, or even other administrative bodies, with 
vague judicial characteristics?  
 
A second problem, related to the workload of the Court, is the potential for 
delay in the resolution of the initial dispute. It is common knowledge that a 
ruling by the ECJ can take considerable time. National competition 
authorities will not be able to proceed with their case until the decision by 
the Court is received, with the added expenses that entails for all parties 
involved.119 In most instances, the referring NCA’s later decision will also 
be open to judicial review before the ordinary national courts, which in turn 
also have the right to make use of Article 234 of the Treaty or to simply let 
be, possibly for reasons of judicial economy. In essence, a delay of many 
years under considerable legal uncertainty can be imagined. While I am 
certain most companies involved in competition litigation matters can 
shoulder the legal expenses, time is money and it is unfair to deny them the 
right to fair and speedy trial, a fundamental right, though not always abided 
by, in most civilized legal systems.  
 
In sum, it is entirely uncertain that allowing NCAs to seek a preliminary 
ruling will substantially increase the uniform and consistent application of 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. Furthermore, by allowing the acceptance of 
questions referred by national competition authorities, which do not form 
part of the national judicial system, the Court’s workload will increase and 
add further delays to the dispute’s resolution. Such a lengthy, costly process 
could very well dissuade the ordinary courts in Member States, reviewing 
an NCA’s decision, from submitting questions which are essential for the 
uniform application of Community law, and the entire system of judicial 
cooperation established by Article 234 of the Treaty could be undermined. 
4.3.3 Possible consequences for the Swedish, 
Danish, and Finnish national competition 
authorities 
With my heart and legal education connected to the northernmost territory 
of Europe, this section, in loving service, explores whether the Swedish, 
Danish, and Finnish national competition authorities could seek the advice 
                                                                                                                            
judicial panel and those reserved in the Statute for the ECJ itself. Article 225(3) accords the 
CFI power for the first time to hear preliminary ruling references in specific areas laid 
down by the Statute of the Court of Justice. Where the CFI believes that the case requires a 
decision of principle, likely to affect the unity or consistency of Community law, it may 
refer the case to the ECJ. Preliminary rulings given by the CFI can, exceptionally, be 
subject to review by the ECJ, under the conditions laid down in the Statute, where there is a 
serious risk to the unity or consistency of Community law being affected. See Article 62 of 
the Statute of the Court of Justice. 
118 Note 3 above, pp. 473, 478, 1077. 
119 This conclusion was also shared by Polina Koursarou, Legal officer of the Cyprus 
Competition Authority, in an email correspondence received on 4 March 2005.  
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of the European Court of Justice by way of a preliminary ruling reference. 
Other NCAs fall outside of the scope of this paper, yet are readily analyzed, 
by those interested, through an application of Syfait and the Court’s 
jurisprudence defining a court or tribunal under Article 234 of the Treaty. 
4.3.3.1 Sweden 
In Sweden, the Swedish Competition Act (1993:20)120 protects a culture of 
fair play between market actors. In short, the legislation stipulates that the 
Swedish Competition Authority (Konkurrensverket) can demand that any 
company found in violation of Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty, or its 
national counterparts, is to suspend immediately any such infringing 
measures.121 The Swedish Competition Authority, on the other hand, has no 
power to impose fines. Fines for violating Law 1993:20 are sought before 
the Local Court of Stockholm (Stockholms Tingsrätt), whereby they 
assume, in essence, the role of prosecutor.122 Moreover, decisions of the 
Swedish Competition Authority can be appealed to the Market Court 
(Marknadsdomstolen), where they defend their decision as a party to the 
trial.123  
 
As to whether the Swedish Competition Authority can seek a preliminary 
ruling reference, I find this to be highly unlikely if not impossible. First, 
while it is true that the body reaches decisions requiring companies to cease 
their violations, these are, in my opinion, of a strictly administrative nature. 
Secondly, they have no power to impose penalties, as did the Greek 
Competition Commission in Syfait. Third, the Swedish Competition 
Authority’s composition has none of the same attributes as the Greek 
Competition Commission with its attached, for the most part independent, 
secretariat. The Swedish Competition Authority acts as both investigator 
and decision-maker in national and Community infringement cases. Finally, 
and maybe most importantly, their independence is not provided for by 
national legislation. This is not, however, important under the Swedish 
competition regime, since all decisions reached by the Swedish Competition 
Authority can be directly appealed before the impartial Market Court, 
ensuring judicial fairness.  
 
Based on the above, the Swedish Competition Authority lacks the ability to 
constitute a court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 234 of the Treaty. 
On the other hand, as ordinary courts of law, both the Local Court of 
Stockholm and the Market Court can, in cases involving the application of 
Articles 81 and 82, request a preliminary ruling from the European Court of 
Justice. 
                                                 
120 Konkurrenslag, SFS 1993:20. English version available at www.konkurrensverket.se, 
language English, section Competition, subsection Competition legislation. 
121 Ibid., para. 23.  
122 Ibid., para. 26. 
123 Ibid., para 60. 
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4.3.3.2 Denmark 
Denmark promotes workable national and Community competition by way 
of the Danish Competition Act124. The enforcement of the Danish 
Competition Act and any subordinate rules issued there under fall under the 
jurisdiction of a politically independent body, the Danish Competition 
Council. The Council takes up cases on its own initiative, upon notification 
or complaint, or by referral from the European Commission.125 As to its 
composition, the Danish Competition Council consists of a Chairman and 
18 members. The King appoints the Chairman for a period of up to four 
years and the Minister for Economic and Business Affairs appoints the other 
members. Their makeup is to cover a comprehensive knowledge of public as 
well as private business activity, including experience in legal, economic, 
financial, and consumer-related matters. The Chairman and eight of the 
members shall be independent of commercial and consumer related 
interests. According to further directions by the Minister for Economic and 
Business Affairs, the remaining members are appointed on the 
recommendation of trade, consumer, and municipal organizations.126
 
The Danish Competition Authority is the secretariat of the Danish 
Competition Council with respect to cases under the Competition Act and 
attends to its day-to-day enforcement on behalf of the Council.127 While the 
Competition Authority falls under the organizational hierarchy of the 
Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs, full independence when it 
comes to enforcing the Danish Competition Act is said to exist.128  
 
The Minister for Economic and Business Affairs, in addition to his vested 
powers regarding its composition, also lays down rules of procedure for the 
Council as well as rules on the activities of the Danish Competition Council 
and the Danish Competition Authority, including rules on dismissal of 
Council members or their deputies upon the recommendation of the 
Chairman of the Competition Council, before the expiry of a period.129      
 
Decisions made by the Council may be brought before the Danish 
Competition Appeals Tribunal. Its jurisdiction is compulsory since decisions 
made by the Council cannot be brought before any other administrative 
authority or courts of law until the Appeals Tribunal has made its decision. 
The Appeals Tribunal is composed of a Chairman, who shall be qualified 
for the post as a Supreme Court Judge, and two other members, who shall 
be proficient in economics and law, respectively. The Minister for 
Economic and Business Affairs lays down the rules on the activities of the 
                                                 
124 Consolidated Competition Act No. 539 of 28 June 2002 (Act No. 384 of 10 June 1997 as 
amended by Act No. 416 of 31 May 2000 and Act No. 426 of 6 June 2002). Available at 
www.ks.dk/english/competition/legislation/comp-act539-02.  
125 Ibid., Article 14(1). 
126 Ibid., Article 15(1). 
127 Ibid., Article 15(2). 
128 Introduction to The Danish Competition Act, section 16 The competition authorities. 
Available at www.ks.dk/english/competition/legislation/guide.  
129 Note 124 above, Article 14(3). 
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Appeals Tribunal and appoints the Chairman and the members, whereas 
both are to be independent of commercial interests. Their appointment is to 
cease by the end of the month in which they attain the age of 70.130
 
Having reviewed the organisation and powers of the above entities, are any 
of them potential courts or tribunals within the meaning of Article 234 of 
the Treaty? The Danish Competition Authority answered the question as 
follows: 
 
In our practice we have so far considered, that it theoretically is possible for the Danish 
Competition Appeals Tribunal to ask the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, but that it is not 
possible for the Danish Competition Council to make such a request.131  
 
While no further elaboration was given, their conclusion makes perfect 
sense. Recalling the composition of the Danish Competition Council, only 
the Chairman and eight out of a total of eighteen members are to be free 
from commercial and consumer related interest, the remaining are connected 
to trade, consumer, and municipal influences. Unlike the Greek Competition 
Commission in Syfait, the Danish Competition Act does not specifically 
provide for the operational and personal independences of its members in 
relation to the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs and its 
secretariat, the Danish Competition Authority. While Denmark attests to the 
political independence of the Council, its close connection to these two 
bodies could, in my opinion, raise warning flags. Hence, neither the Danish 
Competition Council nor the Danish Competition Authority could 
reasonably fulfil the independence criterion provided for in Syfait and 
defined in the earlier jurisprudence defining a court or tribunal under Article 
234.  
 
Regarding the Danish Competition Appeals Tribunal, its jurisdiction is 
compulsory, independence is provided for in law to all its members, and the 
Minister for Economic and Business Affairs can only decide upon its rules 
of activity, not the dismissal of its members. While subsequent legal remedy 
to Danish courts of law or other administrative authorities is available to 
affected parties after the Danish Competition Appeals Tribunal has reached 
its decision, such a possibility should not hinder the right to seek a 
preliminary ruling, if one follows the reasoning of AG Jacobs in Syfait. 
Based on the above, I whole-heartedly agree with the Danish Competition 
Authority that it is theoretically possible for the Danish Competition 
Appeals Tribunal to refer questions on Community law before the European 
Court of Justice, if the Court follows the Opinion of Advocate General 
Jacobs in Syfait. 
4.3.3.3 Finland 
The Finnish Competition Authority is similar to their Swedish counterpart, 
concerning organisation and powers. By way of the Act on Competition 
                                                 
130 Ibid., Articles 19-21. 
131 Email correspondence with Thomas Herping Nielsen of the Danish Competition 
Authority, 18 March 2005. 
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Restrictions (480/1992)132 and through general advocacy, the Finnish 
Competition Authority protects sound and effective economic 
competition.133 According to the Act, they are empowered to investigate 
competition restrictions and their effects. Upon finding that a business 
undertaking or an association of business undertakings competes in a 
manner contrary to the provisions of the Finnish Competition Act, they are 
to initiate proceedings to eliminate the competition restriction or its negative 
effects.134 If the harmful effects mentioned cannot be eliminated through 
negotiation or otherwise, the Competition Authority shall bring action 
before the Market Court, which possesses the dual role of prohibiting 
competition restrictive measures/imposing infringement fines and acting as 
the first instance of appeal when appealing against decisions made by the 
Finnish Competition Authority.135 Moreover, the certain decisions of the 
Market Court can be appealed against to the Supreme Administrative 
Court.136  
 
Based on the above, the decisions reached by the Finnish Competition 
Authority assume, like the competition authority in Sweden, an 
administrative, not judicial, nature. Consequently, they lack the ability to 
make preliminary ruling references. However, both the Market Court and 
Supreme Administrative Court fall under the auspices of Article 234 of the 
Treaty, when deciding upon issues with a European Community dimension. 
 
 
 
       
 
       
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
132 Act on Competition Restrictions (480/1992), including amendment (318/2004). 
Available at www.kilpailuvirasto.fi/cgi-bin/english.cgi?luku=legislation&sivu=act-on-
competition-restrictions-amended. 
133 Ibid., Article 1. 
134 Ibid., Article 12(1). 
135 Ibid., Articles 12(3), 16, 17, 21(1) 
136 Ibid., Article 21(2). 
 44
5 Concluding remarks 
Through some four decades of jurisprudence defining a court or tribunal of a 
Member State for the purposes of Article 234 of the Treaty, the Court has 
systematically relaxed several of the criteria for making such a 
determination. A liberal approach has been adopted by the Court of Justice 
and both the inter partes and independent criterion have been cast to the 
wayside. Such disregard could very well have a few of their original 
establishers in Vaassen (née Göbbels) tossing and turning in their graves. 
Moreover, to the fear of many, a future positive ruling in Syfait by the ECJ 
will allow certain national competition authorities the right to make use of 
preliminary rulings, with the added potential of becoming a powerful point 
of reference for other administrative bodies, with certain judicial 
characteristics, seeking the same right. While a liberal interpretation of a 
court or tribunal was necessary in the early days for the proliferation of 
Commmunity law and the establishment of the Common Market, such an 
approach is today outdated. Due to the Court’s overwhelming caseload, with 
talks of further reform needed in the organisation and structure of the ECJ, 
and the recent addition of 15 Member States able to make use of Article 
234, the time is ripe to tighten the strings. Waiting makes no sense and 
could have serious repercussions, possibly felt for years to come. So, to the 
Judges in Syfait, ruling upon the admissibility of the Greek Competition 
Commission’s Article 234 reference, I have only three words to say: deny, 
deny, deny!   
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